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Buse: San Diego's Vulnerable Vernal Pool Species

CAN A MULTI-SPECIES HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLAN SAVE SAN
DIEGO’S VULNERABLE VERNAL
POOL SPECIES?
JOHN BUSE*

One might ask, when all is said and done, “who cares about the fairy
shrimp and the other vernal pool species?” Fairy shrimp, when they
manage to survive to adulthood, are one-quarter inch fully grown. For
the most part, they are hard to see by the naked eye. There are not
many left, and if gone, who would miss them? Surely, the casual
observer passing through the Southern California landscape would not
notice one way or the other. The biologists tell us that every species
has an essential and unique [role] to play in the food chain that
supports us all. If the fairy shrimp ultimately become extinct in the
San Diego region, they will cease to be a devourer of lower forms of
life in the food chain, such as bacteria and micro-algae on clay
particles, which could impact species below. Similarly, the fairy
shrimp would not be available food for creatures above in the chain,
such as waterfowl and toads, which look to them for their diet. In the
microscopic view, the fairy shrimp may make little identifiable
difference. But if this type of destruction is treated on a case-by-case
basis as an unimportant loss, it does not take long before life on this
planet is in jeopardy. Congress saw that threat when it enacted the
Endangered Species Act. Congress demonstrated foresight by
realizing that the country’s present understanding of the value of a
myriad of life forms was not yet known, and that extinction should be
prevented by protecting both the individual species and the
1
ecosystems upon which those species depended for survival.

* Senior Attorney and Legal Director, Center for Biological Diversity. The author dedicates this
article to the memory of the Honorable Rudi M. Brewster (1932-2012), who had the patience to give
some very small creatures their day in court. The author also wishes to thank Dan Rohlf, Neil Levine
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INTRODUCTION: WHO CARES ABOUT THE FAIRY SHRIMP?

The Endangered Species Act 2 (hereinafter “ESA” or “the Act”)
protects some of the rarest and most charismatic mammals on earth,
including polar bears, wolves, jaguars, and orcas. The ESA also protects
less conspicuous species and their habitats. Not all species are equal
under the law; for example, plants are afforded substantially less
protection, 3 and the Act excludes pest insects if their protection “would
present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.” 4 But the ESA
does provide a remarkable degree of taxonomic equality for most
covered species, generally treating bears and burying beetles as equals. 5
This equality infuriates opponents of the Act, such as trade associations
and water suppliers who are not persuaded that Delhi Sands flowerloving flies and Santa Ana suckers merit the same conservation efforts as
bald eagles and Florida panthers. 6 Yet the Act recognizes that even
small, non-charismatic creatures may provide essential ecological
services. 7
Judge Rudi M. Brewster’s lyrical reflection on the fairy shrimp in
Southwest Center v. Bartel 8 places the ESA’s taxonomically egalitarian
approach in the lineage of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, in which
the United States Supreme Court observed that “Congress was concerned
about the unknown uses that endangered species might have and about
the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in the chain of life on
this planet.” 9 Judge Brewster’s recognition that the ESA is intended to
avoid small, incremental losses to animals and ecosystems that most
people may never notice did not change the law, since the ESA has

and Noah Greenwald for their assistance in preparing this article.
1
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (S.D. Cal. 2006)
(citation omitted).
2
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531–1544 (Westlaw 2012).
3
Compare 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012) with 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538(a)(1)
(Westlaw 2012).
4
16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(6) (Westlaw 2012).
5
The federal government was slow to list invertebrates and plants, and the list of
endangered and threatened species was imbalanced in favor of vertebrates for much of its history. D.
Noah Greenwald et al., Factors Affecting the Rate and Taxonomy of Species Listings Under the US
Endangered Species Act, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE
CONSERVATION COMMITMENT 65 (Dale D. Goble, J. Michael Scott & Frank W. Davis eds., 2006).
6
See id. at 63 (showing the effect of listing controversies).
7
See, e.g., YVONNE BASKIN, THE WORK OF NATURE: HOW THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE
SUSTAINS US 109–10 (1997) (discussing ecological services provided by soil microflora and
microfauna).
8
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
9
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178–79 (1978) (quoted in Sw. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1125).
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always embodied this principle. But his words are central to a remarkable
ruling that invalidated part of the San Diego Multiple Species
Conservation Program (“MSCP”). 10 The San Diego MSCP is a “habitat
conservation plan” (HCP). For thirty years, HCPs have been the premier
tool for reconciling development with the conservation requirements of
the ESA. HCPs have been quite successful in accommodating
development; however, they have had a decidedly mixed record in
achieving the ESA’s conservation goals. Southwest Center v. Bartel
points the way forward by restoring species recovery to its rightful place
as the primary criterion for evaluating the adequacy of HCPs. 11
II.

THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION FOR THE PRESERVATION
OF ENDANGERED SPECIES

A.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

In the 1978 decision of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the
Supreme Court called the ESA “the most comprehensive legislation for
the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.” 12
This observation is still accurate today, nearly forty years after enactment
of the ESA. 13 In Tennessee Valley Authority, the Supreme Court
appeared to elevate the conservation of endangered species above most
other considerations, holding that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in
enacting [the ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost.” 14 Additionally, the Court held that the
ESA reflects “an explicit congressional decision to require agencies to
afford first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered
species.” 15 Subsequent ESA amendments and decisions have eroded to
some extent the Supreme Court’s recognition that the ESA is intended to
halt extinction “whatever the cost.” However, the Court’s emphatic
admonition that “Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it
abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording

10

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, MULTIPLE SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM (1998).
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
12
Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 180.
13
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 supplanted earlier conservation efforts, including the
1966 Endangered Species Preservation Act and the 1969 Endangered Species Conservation Act. See
DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION 21–24 (1989).
14
Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 184.
15
Id. at 185.
11
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endangered species the highest of priorities,” remains in force. 16
Moreover, the Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill decision reflects
an early and prescient recognition that the purpose of the ESA is to
recover species. Thus, it is intended not only to “halt” but to “reverse the
trend toward species extinction.” 17 In other words, the ESA is intended
to do more than merely ensure the survival of endangered species—it is
intended to promote the recovery of species to the point where they no
longer need the protections afforded by the Act. 18
The ESA’s protections generally apply only to those species
formally “listed” as endangered or threatened through a process
described in Section 4 of the Act. 19 An “endangered” species is one that
is in “danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range,” while a “threatened” species is “likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future.” 20 “Critical habitat,” which
contains the areas essential to the conservation of the species, is
supposed to be designated concurrently with the listing. 21
Once a species is listed, two primary conservation mechanisms
apply. The first is Section 9 of the ESA, which prohibits any person from
“taking” an endangered fish or wildlife species. 22 “Taking” is broadly
defined to include harassing, harming, pursuing, wounding or killing. 23
“Harming” includes “significant habitat modification or degradation
where it . . . injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.” 24
The second mechanism is Section 7 of the ESA, which directs all
federal agencies to “insure” that actions they authorize, fund, or carry out
are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse

16

Id. at 194.
Id. at 184.
18
Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir.
2004) (“[T]he ESA was enacted not merely to forestall the extinction of species (i.e., promote a
species survival), but to allow a species to recover to the point where it may be delisted.”); see 16
U.S.C.A. § 1532(3) (Westlaw 2012) (equating “conservation” with recovery).
19
16 U.S.C.A. § 1533 (Westlaw 2012).
20
16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(6), (20) (Westlaw 2012).
21
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1532(5)(A), 1533(a)(3) (Westlaw 2012). Critical habitat designation,
however, rarely occurs concurrently with listing, and many listed species do not have designated
critical habitat. See Kalyani Robbins, Recovery of an Endangered Provision: Untangling and
Reviving Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1095, 1107–08
(2010).
22
16 U.S.C.A. § 1538(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012).
23
16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19) (Westlaw 2012). See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys.
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704–05 (1995).
24
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (Westlaw 2012).
17
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modification of [critical habitat] of such species.” 25 If an agency’s action
may affect listed terrestrial species, the agency must enter formal
consultation with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 26 which
prepares a “biological opinion” that evaluates the potential jeopardy and
adverse modification of critical habitat that may result from the action. 27
Both the jeopardy and adverse modification analyses must consider the
recovery of the affected species, not just their survival. 28 A biological
opinion may also authorize taking of listed species through an incidental
take statement. 29
From its inception, the ESA has been intended to conserve not only
endangered species themselves, but also “the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend.” 30 By all meaningful
criteria, the ESA has been extremely successful. Listing correlates
strongly with survival. 31 When this Article went to press, there were
1,464 domestic species listed as endangered or threatened. 32 Only two
species have been removed from the list of endangered and threatened
species as a result of extinction after listing: the dusky seaside sparrow
and the Mariana mallard. 33 It is difficult to predict how many species
would have gone extinct without the ESA. A study comparing the actual
and projected extinction rate of listed species concluded that the Act has
prevented the extinction of 227 species. 34

25

16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012).
Hereinafter Fish and Wildlife Service.
27
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (Westlaw 2012). The
Department of Commerce has parallel jurisdiction over marine species, including listing,
consultation, and issuance of incidental take permits.
28
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (Westlaw 2012) (regulatory definitions of “jeopardize the continued
existence” and “adverse modification” of critical habitat); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2007) (despite the regulatory definition’s reference
to “both the survival and recovery,” jeopardy may result if an action significantly impairs recovery;
jeopardy analysis must consider effects on recovery in addition to effects on survival); Gifford
Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (invalidating
regulatory definition of “adverse modification” to the extent it requires appreciable diminishment of
the value of the critical habitat for both survival and recovery).
29
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b)(4) (Westlaw 2012).
30
16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b) (Westlaw 2012).
31
Martin F.J. Taylor et al., The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative
Analysis, 55 BIOSCIENCE 360, 366 (2005). But see Paul J. Ferraro et al., The Effectiveness of the US
Endangered Species Act: An Econometric Analysis Using Matching Methods, 54 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 245, 255–56 (2007) (concluding the ESA works best when it is backed up by money for
conservation).
32
CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, unpublished data.
33
Id. (eight other delisted species were initially listed after they were already extinct).
34
J.M. Scott et al., By the Numbers, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY:
RENEWING THE CONSERVATION COMMITMENT 31 (Dale D. Goble, J. Michael Scott & Frank W.
Davis eds. 2006).
26
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In addition to preventing extinction, the ESA is also highly
successful in promoting recovery. The concept of species recovery is
incorporated in the ESA’s definition of “conservation,” which means
“the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary.” 35
Species that are listed for longer times are more likely to be improving
and less likely to be declining. 36 Species for which critical habitat has
been designated for two or more years are more than twice as likely to be
improving and less than half as likely to be declining as species without
designated critical habitat. 37 A review of recovery trends among all
threatened and endangered species in eight northeastern states found that
ninety-three percent have increased in population size or have remained
stable since being listed. 38
B.

HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS: LICENSES TO TAKE

In the 1982 amendments to the ESA, Congress established a limited
exception to the take prohibition for activities subject to the Section 7
consultation process. 39 If an activity is performed or authorized by a
federal agency, the federal agency may be authorized to take species
through an incidental take statement included in the “biological opinion”
issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service. 40 The authorized take must be
truly incidental to the action, not the purpose of the action. 41 Consistent
with Section 7(a)(2), the authorized taking may not jeopardize the
continued existence of any listed species or destroy or adversely modify
the critical habitat of such species. 42 Incidental take statements must
specify the “reasonable and prudent measures” necessary to minimize the
impact of the incidental taking on the listed species. 43 Federal agencies
and their private permittees who comply with these measures and do not
exceed authorized levels of take are exempted from liability for taking

35

16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(3) (Westlaw 2012).
Taylor et al., supra note 31, at 361.
37
Id. at 362. See Robbins, supra note 21, at 1104.
38
KIERAN SUCKLING, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, MEASURING THE SUCCESS OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: RECOVERY TRENDS IN THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 7 (2006).
39
DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION 78–79 (1989).
40
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b)(4) (Westlaw 2012).
41
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b)(4)(B) (Westlaw 2012).
42
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2), (b)(4)(A), (B) (Westlaw 2012).
43
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii) (Westlaw 2012).
36

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol6/iss1/6

6

Buse: San Diego's Vulnerable Vernal Pool Species

2012] SAN DIEGO’S VULNERABLE VERNAL POOL SPECIES

59

listing species. 44 Incidental take statements are one of the ESA’s two
principal means of reconciling economic development with the
fundamental priorities of the Act, which the Supreme Court viewed as
“affording endangered species the highest of priorities.” 45
But what of non-federal activities that may affect listed species?
Many, if not most, local land-use decisions have no federal involvement
and are therefore not subject to the ESA’s consultation requirement.
Conversely, they are not eligible for the take exemption provided by an
incidental take statement through the Section 7 consultation process.
Congress addressed this dilemma in the 1982 ESA amendments by
creating a permit system for non-federal applicants that is analogous to,
but distinct from, the incidental take statement process. 46 This process is
covered by Section 10 of the Act, which provides that the Fish and
Wildlife Service may issue incidental take permits in connection with
“conservation plans” that meet certain requirements. 47 A conservation
plan must specify:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)
(iv)

the impact which will likely result from [the] taking;
what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such
impacts, and the funding that will be available to implement
such steps;
what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered
and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and
such other measures that the Secretary may require as being
necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan. 48

Section 10 conservation plans are subject to public review and
comment. 49 Because approval of a conservation plan is a federal action,
the plans are also subject to review under the National Environmental
Policy Act 50 and intra-agency consultation pursuant to Section 7 of the

44

16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b)(4) (Westlaw 2012).
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
46
See Christopher H.M. Carter, Comment, A Dual Track for Incidental Takings:
Reexamining Sections 7 and 10 of the Endangered Species Act, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135
(1991).
47
16 U.S.C.A. § 1539 (Westlaw 2012). Prior to the 1982 amendments, non-federal parties
could obtain exemptions from the ESA’s take prohibition only for scientific purposes or to enhance
the propagation or survival of listed species. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING
HANDBOOK 1 (1996) [hereinafter HCP HANDBOOK]; Carter, supra note 46, at 155.
48
16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2012).
49
16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (Westlaw 2012).
50
42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (Westlaw 2012). See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen,
760 F.2d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 1985).
45
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ESA. 51 Prior to issuance of an incidental take permit, the Fish and
Wildlife Service must find that:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

the taking will be incidental;
the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize
and mitigate the impacts of such taking;
the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will
be provided;
the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
survival and recovery of the species in the wild; and
the measures, if any, required [as being necessary or appropriate
for purposes of the plan] will be met. 52

The term “habitat conservation plan” (HCP) does not appear in the
ESA, but the term is now consistently used to describe the conservation
plans contemplated by Section 10. 53 HCPs are the ESA’s other primary
means of accommodating economic development with the demands of
species protection. An HCP is essentially a bargain struck between the
developer and the Fish and Wildlife Service; it allows activities that
destroy or degrade the habitat of listed species to proceed in exchange for
the conservation commitments described in the HCP. 54 Accordingly,
private parties (or their municipal proxies, who have land-use authority
and permit development within their jurisdictions) are allowed to destroy
a certain amount of habitat, taking or even killing listed species, in
exchange for setting aside habitat for the affected species.
The first HCP was commenced prior to the 1982 ESA amendments.
The 1982 amendments ratified and were expressly modeled on the
approach taken with the San Bruno Mountain conservation plan. 55 That
plan was intended to allow controversial residential development within
the habitat of the endangered mission blue butterfly south of San
Francisco. 56 However, in practice, private applicants were slow to adopt
the San Bruno Mountain model. In the decade following the 1982
amendments, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued only fourteen

51

I.e., when reviewing a conservation plan under Section 10 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539
(Westlaw 2012), the Fish and Wildlife Service must consult with itself. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2)
(Westlaw 2012). See Friends, 760 F.2d at 980–81.
52
16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (Westlaw 2012).
53
HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 47, at 1–2.
54
John Kostyack, The Need for HCP Reform: Five Points of Consensus, 16 ENDANGERED
SPECIES UPDATE 47 (1999).
55
Carter, supra note 46, at 156.
56
Id. at 157–58; Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 979–81 (9th
Cir. 1985).
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incidental take permits. 57 The slow pace of HCP adoption may be
explained in part by the ability of a private applicant to circumvent the
HCP process by obtaining take coverage through the Section 7 process if
its project requires any federal permit. 58 This practice remains
widespread despite the increased pace of HCP adoption, suggesting that
perverse incentives exist for non-federal applicants to utilize the Section
7 process instead of obtaining incidental take permits when there is even
minor federal involvement. 59
From 1992 onward, the number of HCPs rapidly increased with
vigorous promotion by Bruce Babbitt, President Clinton’s Secretary of
the Interior. 60 By 2005, the Fish and Wildlife Service had approved
almost 450 HCPs covering nearly forty million acres. 61 During this
period of growth, the Fish and Wildlife Service also strongly promoted
the development of HCPs that cover a range of both federally listed and
unlisted species. 62 These multiple species HCPs, or “MSHCPs”,
typically cover dozens of species and very large areas, and they provide
take coverage for extended, multi-generational periods of time. 63 The
permittees in multiple species HCPs are generally municipalities and
public agencies, not individual landowners. For example, the Western
Riverside County MSHCP approved by the Fish and Wildlife Service in
2004 covers twenty five listed and 121 unlisted species and 1.3 million
acres, and it has a permit term of seventy-five years. 64 There are
currently twenty three permittees participating in and covered by the
Western Riverside MSHCP, including two state agencies, sixteen cities,
and the County of Riverside. 65 The incidental take permits issued to
these participants exempt private landowners and developers from take
liability if they obtain valid land-use approvals from the plan
participants. Thus, private landowners and developers are third party

57

Jennifer Jester, Comment, Habitat Conservation Plans Under Section 10 of the
Endangered Species Act: The Alabama Beach Mouse and the Unfulfilled Mandate of Species
Recovery, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 131, 133 (1998).
58
Carter, supra note 46, at 163–65.
59
Telephone interview with Neil Levine, Staff Attorney, Earthlaw and Earthjustice (Mar. 12,
2012). Mr. Levine represented plaintiffs in the San Diego MSCP case.
60
Jocelyn Kaiser, When a Habitat Is Not a Home, SCIENCE, June 1997, at 1636–38.
61
Matthew E. Rahn et al., Species Coverage in Multispecies Habitat Conservation Plans:
Where’s the Science? 56 BIOSCIENCE 613 (2006).
62
Id. at 613–14.
63
Id. at 615.
64
Id.; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., AMENDMENT TO THE BIOLOGICAL OPINION REGARDING
ISSUANCE OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 10(A)(1)(B) PERMIT (TE088609-1) FOR THE
WESTERN RIVERSIDE COUNTY MULTIPLE SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, RIVERSIDE
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 2 (2011).
65
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 64, at 1–2.
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beneficiaries covered by the “umbrella” of the plan participants’
incidental take permits. 66
MSHCPs have been criticized by scientists and environmentalists
for a number of serious flaws, including the failure to set aside sufficient
habitat for covered species, 67 plans that are based around a few indicator
species but fail to protect other covered species, 68 overbroad plans that
respond to the permittees’ economic incentive to cover as many species
as possible without providing localized scientific information for specific
conservation needs, 69 plans that lack specific conservation actions
because they cover species that are not confirmed present in the plan
area, 70 the “striking lack of information on the basic biology of many
species for which take permits had been given,” 71 approval of HCPs that
allow a net loss of habitat for listed species, 72 and plans that are
negotiated and largely finalized behind closed doors before they are
released for public review. 73
Reports following the implementation of MSHCPs have noted other
problems. Lands slated for conservation as essential habitat by the
Western Riverside County MSHCP have been developed as a result of
political pressure. 74 At the height of the housing market, land costs in
Riverside County dramatically increased, making it more difficult than
anticipated to acquire conservation lands in areas subject to the greatest
development pressures and causing acquisition to lag behind the pace of
development. 75 As a result, some of the large, contiguous conservation
reserves described in the Western Riverside County MSHCP could not
be assembled. 76 In some cases, conservation reserve lands can be
acquired later at lower prices, but if key habitat areas are developed, they
are forever removed from the MSHCP reserve system, leading to

66

Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1128 (S.D. Cal 2006).
Kaiser, supra note 60, at 1636.
68
Id.
69
Rahn et al., supra note 61, at 616.
70
Id.
71
Elaine K. Harding et al., The Scientific Foundations of Habitat Conservation Plans: A
Quantitative Assessment, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 488, 492 (2001). See PETER KAREIVA ET AL.,
NAT’L CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS, UNIV. OF CAL., USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANS 45–46 (1999).
72
Kostyack, supra note 54, at 48.
73
Id. at 52.
74
Duane W. Gang et al., Losing Ground: Ambitious Conservation Plan Applied Unevenly,
RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 8, 2006, www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/mediaarchive/RiversideCounty12-8-06.pdf.
75
Id.
76
Id.
67
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fragmented habitats for some species. 77 A 2008 RAND report on the
Western Riverside County MSHCP also concluded that funding
mechanisms for acquiring conservation lands may not be adequate,
depending on the direction of the regional housing market. 78
MSHCPs differ from each other in many of the details, and certain
criticisms may not apply to all plans. However, one criticism is
applicable to most multispecies plans is that MSHCPs are designed to
maintain the survival of covered species, rather than to promote their
recovery. 79 In contrast to the overall favorable recovery trend for listed
species, a 2005 study estimated that forty to fifty percent of listed species
covered by MSHCPs show declining trends. 80 A more recent study found
that, while species covered by HCPs generally show improving recovery
status, the evidence for the recovery benefits of MSHCPs is mixed,
suggesting that the Fish and Wildlife Service’s policy of encouraging
MSHCPs “may be misguided.” 81 It is difficult to identify precise causes
for the declining trends, but at a minimum, these results suggest that
HCPs should focus on setting aside sufficient habitat to do more than
keep covered species on life support and stay consistent with the ESA’s
“overriding goal of recovering endangered and threatened species.” 82
C.

HCPS IN COURT

While the growth in HCPs during the 1990s supported a small
industry of commentary on both the benefits and drawbacks of HCPs,
there have been relatively few published judicial decisions regarding the
adequacy of HCPs. The San Bruno Mountain proto-HCP was upheld by
the Ninth Circuit following a legal challenge. 83 In Friends of
Endangered Species v. Jantzen, the plaintiffs challenged the Fish and
77

Id.
LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, & ENV’T, BALANCING
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: COSTS, REVENUES, AND BENEFITS OF THE WESTERN RIVERSIDE
COUNTY MULTIPLE SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, 162–63 (2008). This study anticipates
that reserve assembly costs could be lower than 2007 estimates if the housing market downturn
continues, as it has, but the Western Riverside County MSHCP faces a dilemma because a market
downturn means lower prices for acquiring conservation lands, but also lower revenues to fund the
plan. Id. at 162–64.
79
See Kaiser, supra note 60, at 1636; Kostyack, supra note 54, at 49; Jester, supra note 57,
at 182–87.
80
Taylor et al., supra note 31, at 361.
81
Christian Langpap & Joe Kerkvliet, Endangered Species Conservation on Private Land:
Assessing the Effectiveness of Habitat Conservation Plans, J. ENVTL. ECON. AND MGMT.
(forthcoming 2012).
82
Jester, supra note 57, at 186. See also Langpap & Kerkvliet, supra note 81 (indicating that
species covered by HCPs “benefit from inclusion in spatially larger plans”).
83
Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 982–84 (9th Cir. 1985).
78
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Wildlife Service’s reliance on a biological study in authorizing the
incidental take of mission blue butterflies. 84 Unfortunately for the
plaintiffs, the House Conference Report for the 1982 ESA Amendments
had specifically characterized this study as “independent,” “exhaustive,”
and “extensive,” and the Ninth Circuit deferred to the Fish and Wildlife
Service in holding that reliance on the study was not arbitrary and
capricious. 85 Friends of Endangered Species suggests that a legal
challenge to the very plan on which Congress based Section 10’s
substantive standards for HCPs is unlikely to succeed, but it provides
little guidance on interpreting those standards. 86
The challenge to the HCP for the Alabama beach mouse fared
better. 87 In Sierra Club v. Babbitt, the plaintiffs focused on the adequacy
of funding for acquisition of off-site beach mouse habitat intended to
mitigate the effects of two beach-front residential development
projects. 88 In a searching review of the administrative record, the district
court found that there was no support for the proposed funding levels. 89
Specifically, the court found that the Fish and Wildlife Service ignored
the advice of its own expert personnel and HCP Handbook regarding the
inadequate funding, and improperly relied on speculative unnamed
funding sources to make up any shortfalls. 90 The court concluded that the
speculative HCP funding sources made it impossible for the Service to
comply “with the strict ESA mandate that the HCP ‘minimize and
mitigate’ the effects of the projects to the ‘maximum extent
practicable.’” 91 Thus, the district court evaluated the adequacy of HCP
funding in light of the applicant’s Section 10(a)(2)(B)(ii) obligation to
minimize and mitigate the impacts of the permitted taking. 92 The effect
of the incidental take permits on Alabama beach mouse recovery appears
to have been an implicit consideration in Sierra Club v. Babbitt, where
the court noted that an applicant for an incidental take permit must
submit an HCP “that will—as the name plainly connotes—help
‘conserve’ the entire species by facilitating its survival and recovery.”93
The court noted that the beach mouse habitat had already been greatly
reduced by previous development and hurricanes, and that the Fish and
84

Id. at 981.
Id. at 983.
86
Id. at 982–84.
87
Sierra Club. v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (S.D. Ala. 1998).
88
Id. at 1275, 1280.
89
Id. at 1280–82.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1282.
92
Id. at 1279.
93
Id. at 1278 n.3.
85
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Wildlife Service acknowledged that the designated beach mouse critical
habitat may be insufficient for recovery. 94 Against this background, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the proposed high-rise beach
development, which would further fragment the beach mouse’s
hurricane-prone and already diminished dune habitat, would not impair
the beach mouse’s recovery.
Funding considerations and the feasibility of assembling an
adequate conservation reserve were also factors in the 2000 district court
decision invalidating an incidental take permit for the Natomas Basin
HCP. 95 In that case, the HCP, which covered twenty-six species,
including the endangered giant garter snake, was intended as a regional
conservation plan “to promote biological conservation along with
economic development and the continuation of agriculture within the
Natomas Basin.” 96 The plan’s creators anticipated that the HCP would be
used in connection with incidental take permit applications from the City
of Sacramento, Sacramento County, Sutter County, and other
applicants. 97 According to the HCP, mitigation fees collected from the
permittees would be used to assemble “connected 400 acre blocks of
reserve lands—with one block of at least 2,500 acres—for the benefit of
the giant garter snake and to protect Swainson’s hawk habitat and nesting
areas.” 98 The Natomas Basin HCP provided that habitat acquisition was
to be executed in phases in advance of habitat conversion resulting from
urban development. But as the court in National Wildlife Federation v.
Babbitt noted, the only real phasing requirement was that “no more than
one year shall elapse between receipt of a fee and expenditure of that fee
in the purchase or other acquisition of mitigation land.” 99 The problem
was that, at the time the court reviewed the HCP, only the City of
Sacramento had applied for an incidental take permit, and there was no
certainty that Sacramento and Sutter counties would ever participate in
the HCP. 100 Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence as to whether
mitigation funding would be adequate in the event that only the City of
Sacramento’s lands were developed under the HCP, and “little or no
analysis of the effect on the species of the City’s permit considered on its
own.” 101 The Natomas Basin HCP decision illustrates the perils of

94

Id. at 1280.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
96
Id. at 1280.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1281.
100
Id. at 1298–99.
101
Id. at 1299.
95
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proceeding with a regional HCP effort without having all the participants
lined up, and without a specific evaluation of how listed species will be
affected if only one permittee participates in the plan. 102
Other decisions have been more deferential to the Fish and Wildlife
Service’s findings supporting approval of an HCP. In Center for
Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, a district court in
Texas upheld an HCP that permitted take of three species of cavedwelling invertebrates found in karst limestone formations. 103 The court
was not unsympathetic to the plight of the cave bugs and noted the
applicant’s desire “to profit from suburban consumerism by transforming
Nature’s beauty into upscale shopping venues accompanied no doubt by
lovely, non-porous asphalt parking lots over a part of our water
supply.” 104 However, the court ultimately deferred to the Fish and
Wildlife Service’s conclusions, which it found to be supported by the
record and, in contrast to the Alabama beach mouse case, not
contradicted by the agency’s own personnel. 105
Similarly, the same court that issued the Natomas Basin HCP
decision upheld another Natomas HCP covering the same species. 106 The
court distinguished the earlier case and found that the plan ensured the
survival and recovery of covered species, ensured adequate funding, and
mitigated the impacts of the incidental take to the maximum extent
practicable. 107 With respect to the “maximum extent practicable”
standard for mitigating the effect of permitted take, the court
characterized the plaintiffs’ position as advocating that the “maximum
extent practicable requirement means that the plan must require the
purchase of as much mitigation land as the particular developer possibly
could afford while still going forward with the development.” Whether
or not this characterization is accurate, the court rejected this argument,
concluding that:
The statutory language does not suggest that an applicant must ever
do more than mitigate the effect of its take of species. Thus, if a permit
authorized the destruction of one acre of habitat that normally supports
one individual member of a protected species, it would not be
necessary for the applicant to create 100 acres of new habitat that
would support some 100 individuals of the species, even if the

102

Id. at 1299–1300.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 594 (W.D.
Tex. 2002).
104
Id. at 597.
105
Id. at 623.
106
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, 306 F. Supp. 2d 920 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
107
Id. at 928–29.
103
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particular developer could afford to do so. 108

This conclusion does not mean that an applicant need provide only
one acre of substitute habitat to mitigate the destruction of one acre of
habitat. Instead, the court deferred to the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
construction of Section 10(a)(2)(B)(ii), while recognizing that the agency
has and may set higher mitigation ratios in other circumstances. 109
III. THE SAN DIEGO MSCP
A.

PLANNING AND OPPOSITION

In rapidly urbanizing areas with a high potential for conflict
between new development and habitat for listed species, local
governments have strong incentives to develop large, regional
MSHCPs. 110 Predictably, some of the first regional MSHCPs were
developed in southern California, where this conflict was most heated,
particularly after the listing of the coastal California gnatcatcher as a
threatened species in March 1993. 111 The southern California MSHCPs
were primarily development-driven, not conservation-driven. Developers
saw MSHCPs as a way to avoid having their projects derailed by
gnatcatchers and other listed species. 112
In December 1995, the Fish and Wildlife Service approved an
MSHCP for Orange County covering the gnatcatcher and forty-one other
species on 208,000 acres for seventy-five years. 113 In August 1996, the
Service approved the San Diego MSCP, which covered eighty-five
species and over 580,000 acres in southwestern San Diego County for
fifty years. 114 The MSCP is intended to “streamline and coordinate
existing procedures for review and permitting of project impacts to

108

Id. at 928.
Id. at 929 n.15.
110
See, e.g., DIXON ET AL., supra note 78, at iii.
111
Rahn et al., supra note 61, at 615; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Determination of Threatened Status for the Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 16,742
(Mar. 30, 1993). See WILLIAM FULTON, THE RELUCTANT METROPOLIS: THE POLITICS OF URBAN
GROWTH IN LOS ANGELES 201–23 (1997). The coastal California gnatcatcher is rare but has a range
that includes large areas of southern California, including the coastal sage scrub habitats of San
Diego, Orange, and Riverside Counties coveted by developers. Id.
112
See Gang et al., supra note 74 (noting building industry perception that it is better off with
Western Riverside County MSHCP than without plan); Robert D. Thornton, Searching for
Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act of
1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605 (1991).
113
Id.
114
Rahn et al., supra note 61, at 615; CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 1-1–1-2.
109
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biological resources.” 115 The plan explicitly recognizes the severe threat
to the region’s “biodiversity and long-term biological viability” posed by
rapid urbanization of natural lands, noting that the MSCP planning area
contains over 100 animals and plants that are federally or state-listed,
proposed for listing, candidates for listing, or otherwise considered
sensitive. 116 The MSCP notes that “[r]ecent federal listings and proposed
listings of species in the study area underscore the importance and
urgency of habitat preservation in order to avoid species extinctions and
the need for further listings.” 117 The MSCP acknowledges, however, that
the creation of plan was driven by the need to forestall limitations on
new development associated with species listings. 118 In particular, the
MSCP observes that the gnatcatcher listing “has restricted the region’s
ability to accommodate future growth and development in coastal
habitats.” 119
The San Diego MSCP contemplates participation by several cities
and agencies, but the largest single incorporated portion of the planning
area is the City of San Diego, which includes over 206,000 acres. 120
Indeed, the impetus for the entire MSCP came from the City of San
Diego, and MSCP planning commenced in July 1991 as a way to address
the mitigation needs of the City’s Metropolitan Wastewater
Department. 121 The City of San Diego adopted the MSCP in 1997.122
Also in 1997, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued its Section 10 findings
supporting approval of the MSCP and issued a biological opinion. 123
The conservation model of the MSCP is simple. The “centerpiece”
of the MSCP is the proposal to set aside for conservation 171,917 acres
of vacant lands, which represents just over half of the natural lands in the
planning area. 124 About 52,000 acres of the conserved lands would lie
within the City of San Diego. 125 Based on establishment of these reserve
lands, the MSCP deemed that eighty-five species are adequately
conserved and “covered” by the plan, thus exempting MSCP participants

115

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 1-1.
Id. at 1-5.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 3-13.
121
Id. at 1-6.
122
Ernie Grimm, Land Management Questioned, SAN DIEGO READER, Feb. 16, 2006,
www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2006/feb/16/land-management-questioned/.
123
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1129 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
124
CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 3-8; Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp.
2d at 1129.
125
CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 3-13.
116
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from take liability. 126 The MSCP does not itself establish the
conservation reserve, but it sets target boundaries for the areas that will
be dedicated and acquired during the fifty-year term of the plan. 127 The
plan contemplates a mixture of federal, state, and local funding
mechanisms for assembling the reserve. 128
The MSCP covers a diverse range of ecosystems, including
wetlands. 129 Vernal pools, small seasonal waterbodies that form in claycapped depressions, are one type of wetland. 130 Vernal pools are
occupied by a unique set of species that are specially adapted to this
unusual environment, including the endangered San Diego fairy shrimp
and Riverside fairy shrimp.
Vernal pools are seasonal—the pools contain water in the short winter
months but can be difficult to discern in the landscape during the long
dry months. The fairy shrimp hatch, mature, reproduce, and inhabit the
pools during their short life cycle. Fairy shrimp eggs lie dormant
during the dry season, and may hatch in the next wet season. These
fragile species are extremely sensitive to their environment (including
a specific amount of water; a narrow range of water temperature; the
water quality, chemistry, and salinity; the length of time the pool holds
131
water before it percolates into the clay soil).

In 1997, the Fish and Wildlife Service estimated that ninety to
ninety-seven percent of vernal pool habitats in San Diego County had
been permanently lost. 132 The upland areas that drain into vernal pools—
the vernal pool watershed—are critical to the hydrological and biological
integrity of these wetlands. 133 According to the Fish and Wildlife
Service, efforts to reintroduce vernal pool species into artificially created

126

Id. at 3-22.
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
128
CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 4-1–4-21.
129
Id. at 3-12–3-13.
130
Id. at 3-21; Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
131
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1126–27. See also Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for the San Diego Fairy
Shrimp, 62 Fed. Reg. 4925, 4926 (Feb. 3, 1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (Westlaw 2012));
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for Three
Vernal Pool Plants and the Riverside Fairy Shrimp, 58 Fed. Reg. 41,384 (Aug. 3, 1993) (codified at
50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (Westlaw 2012)).
132
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for
the San Diego Fairy Shrimp, 62 Fed. Reg. at 4926. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F.
Supp. 2d at 1127 (concluding that this loss was “irrevocable” in part based on evidence that vernal
pools “cannot be ‘created’ and [that] there is no known method to replace destroyed pools”).
133
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for
Three Vernal Pool Plants and the Riverside Fairy Shrimp, 58 Fed. Reg. at 41389.
127
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habitat are unsatisfactory, and “the continued survival and recovery of
the [vernal pool species] can only be assured at this time by the
preservation and enhancement of the existing vernal pools and their
associated watersheds.” 134
The MSCP’s treatment of vernal pools is convoluted. The MSCP, as
originally issued, permitted the taking of vernal pool species but assumed
that vernal pools and all other wetlands would be subject to regulation
through the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ Clean Water Act
Section 404 permitting program. 135 Thus, the MSCP assumed that any
development that would impact a vernal pool would require a Section
404 permit and that the Army Corps would consult with the Fish and
Wildlife Service regarding the effects of such development on listed
vernal pool species pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA. 136 However, after
approval of the MSCP, the United States Supreme Court issued a
decision in 2001 indicating that “isolated” waters, including many if not
most vernal pools, were not subject to the Army Corps’ permitting
jurisdiction. 137
In December 1998, a coalition of fourteen environmental and
scientific organizations challenged the City of San Diego’s incidental
take permit for the MSCP in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California. 138 Opposition to the plan had been
fermenting for several years, led by then-Southwest Center for Biological
Diversity staff members David Hogan and Allison Rolfe. 139 Initially,
vernal pool concerns were one part of a wide range of issues raised by
MSCP opponents, which included objections to the adequacy of the
proposed MSCP reserves and the proposed funding mechanisms for the

134

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for
the San Diego Fairy Shrimp, 62 Fed. Reg. at 4931.
135
33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (Westlaw 2012); CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 10, at 3-21–3-22.
136
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
137
Solid Waste Agency v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). See Sw. Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1130–33. It is doubtful whether the approach described in
the MSCP would have been effective in conserving vernal pools and vernal pool species even if
isolated wetlands had remained subject to the Army Corps’ permitting jurisdiction. The Fish and
Wildlife Service has determined that the Section 404 permitting process and the Army Corps’ “no
net loss” policy are inadequate to protect vernal pool habitat. See Determination of Endangered
Status for Three Vernal Pool Plants and the Riverside Fairy Shrimp 58 Fed. Reg. at 41,388–89;
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for the San
Diego Fairy Shrimp 62 Fed. Reg. at 4935–36; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Determination of Endangered or Threatened Status for Four Southwestern California Plants from
Vernal Wetlands and Clay Soils, 63 Fed. Reg. 54,975, 54,987 (Oct. 13, 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.12(h) (Westlaw 2012)).
138
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
139
Levine interview, supra note 59.
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plan. 140 But as the opponents’ legal arguments coalesced, the focus
narrowed to the MSCP’s effectiveness in conserving vernal pools. 141 By
the time the complaint was filed, the focus had further narrowed to the
1997 incidental take permit’s coverage of seven federally listed vernal
pool species, including two invertebrates (the San Diego fairy shrimp
and Riverside fairy shrimp) and five plant species (Otay mesa mint,
California Orcutt grass, San Diego button celery, San Diego mesa mint,
and spreading navarretia). 142
The lawsuit was filed after the City approved the Cousins Market
Center project in Mira Mesa and allowed the destruction of all sixty-four
vernal pools on the site, despite the MSCP’s promises of vernal pool
conservation and avoidance. 143 This project was based on vernal pool
mitigation measures that the Fish and Wildlife Service had itself deemed
inadequate, including vernal pool creation and fairy shrimp relocation.144
This approval signaled to the plaintiffs that the MSCP was ineffective in
averting the extinction of vernal pool species, much less in promoting
their recovery. 145
B.

THE SOUTHWEST CENTER V. BARTEL DECISION

The MSCP litigation stretched over a decade, culminating in Judge
Brewster’s October 13, 2006, decision granting the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment and invalidating the City of San Diego’s incidental
take permit as it applied to the seven vernal pool species. 146
The court dealt first with the invalid assumption in the MSCP and
the City’s incidental take permit that impacts to vernal pool species
would be subject to Army Corps of Engineers’ Section 404 permitting
process and further consultation between the Army Corps and the Fish
and Wildlife Service. 147 Based on the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the

140

Id.
Id.; telephone interview with Dan Rohlf, Clinical Director, Pac. Envtl. Advocacy Ctr.,
Lewis & Clark Law Sch. (Mar. 6, 2012).
142
Rohlf interview, supra note 141; Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at
1123.
143
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
144
Id. at 1153 n.23, 1154 n.24.
145
The Southwest Center plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a temporary restraining
order to block the destruction of the vernal pools associated with this project. Injunctive relief was
denied because the vernal pool species had already been collected and moved to another site. Id. at
1154 n.24.
146
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (S.D. Cal. 2006), opinion
amended and superseded by Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118.
147
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1130–33.
141
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court concluded that it was “highly unlikely that the [Army Corps] would
exercise jurisdiction over the isolated vernal pools at issue in this
case.” 148 Accordingly, the court agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that
the Fish and Wildlife Service had to reinitiate review (meaning the intraagency consultation required by Section 7 of the ESA) of the incidental
take permit as it applied to the vernal pool species. 149 The court also
directed the Fish and Wildlife Service to consider the standards and other
information contained in the recovery plan for the vernal pool species
during the reinitiated consultation. 150 After the Fish and Wildlife Service
issued the MSCP biological opinion, it released the final recovery plan
for the vernal pool species in September 1998. 151 It is not clear whether
the court believed that the release of the recovery plan alone would
trigger reinitiation of consultation, or whether the agency merely had to
consider the recovery plan during the reinitiated consultation required by
the Solid Waste Agency decision. But the court clearly expected that the
recovery plan would inform the terms of the incidental take permit.
If timely completed, FWS would use the recovery plan to evaluate the
sufficiency of the application for an ITP, particularly when the permit
governs a large region for an extensive period of time. Cf. National
Wildlife v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 (Natomas Basin HCP
included provision for incorporating the recovery plan for the
endangered snake when it was developed and approved). If the terms
of the ITP were inconsistent with the strategies and objectives in the
recovery plan, then FWS would need to explain why it reached
152
inconsistent conclusions from the same evidence.

The court also took issue with the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
efforts to distance itself from its own vernal pool species recovery. 153
The Service argued that the recovery plan is not a binding document and
thus the Service is free to deviate from its findings and conclusions. 154
The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had not yet decided the issue, but
that the Eleventh Circuit had held that the Service is not legally obligated

148

Id. at 1133 n.3.
Id. at 1130.
150
Id. at 1136–37. The ESA requires the preparation of recovery plans for listed species that
describe “site-specific management actions,” establish “objective, measurable criteria,” and estimate
the time and cost required to carry out the measures needed to achieve the recovery plan’s
conservation goals. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(f) (Westlaw 2012).
151
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
152
Id. at 1136. See also id. at 1143 n.19 (showing the Fish and Wildlife Service issued
incidental take permit “without the benefit of a Recovery Plan for the vernal pool species”).
153
Id. at 1137 n.16.
154
Id.
149
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to implement a recovery plan because it does not have the force of
law. 155 Judge Brewster “respectfully disagree[d] with the cases
minimizing the importance of recovery plans.” 156 While this
disagreement does not necessarily suggest that recovery plans do have
the force of law and must be fully implemented, it indicates that the Fish
and Wildlife Service may not simply ignore its own recovery plans. 157
The court found a further “egregious flaw” in the MSHCP’s
treatment of vernal pools because the required mitigation for vernal pool
impacts was limited by the “Assurances” contained in the MSHCP’s
implementation agreement without any analysis of the impacts of the
City of San Diego’s development plans on vernal pool species. 158 The
mitigation was “ineffective, unstudied, and inadequate” for the vernal
pool species but was locked in to the MSCP for the plan’s fifty-year
duration. 159 The court viewed this approach as “effectively repealing the
stricter protective ESA standards for the vernal pool species for fifty
years.” 160 This result was a “clear violation” of Section 10 of the ESA,
because it resulted in the issuance of an incidental take permit that “(1)
will not ‘maximize to the extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the
impacts’ of those takings, and (2) could ‘appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.’” 161
The court further emphasized the importance of species recovery
and recovery plans in the portion of the decision dealing with the
MSCP’s twelve-percent “cap” on the loss of additional vernal pool
habitat. The plaintiffs argued that the Fish and Wildlife Service violated
the ESA by approving the MSCP and authorizing the loss of twelve
percent of the remaining vernal pool habitat in the planning area without
analyzing the impact of this loss on the survival and recovery of the
listed vernal pool species. 162 While there was considerable dispute
whether the MSCP allowed the loss of twelve percent of vernal pool
habitat at all and how this cap was to be applied, the court reviewed
biological opinions issued for subsequent projects that affected vernal
pools and concluded that the Fish and Wildlife Service did in fact apply
the twelve-percent cap as a measure of permissible vernal pool
destruction. 163 The court agreed with the plaintiffs that this approach
155

Id. (citing Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 1139–40.
159
Id. at 1146.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 1156. The Fish and Wildlife Service argued that vernal pool destruction was limited
156
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violated the ESA. 164 The twelve-percent cap allowed unavoidable
impacts to vernal pool species to be mitigated by ineffective and
unacceptable measures, was based on an undefined baseline of the
amount of vernal pool habitat remaining, and did not allow for the
assessment of the quality of the affected vernal pool habitat. 165 In
addition, the twelve-percent cap was inconsistent with the scientific data
available to the Fish and Wildlife Service, including the vernal pool
species recovery plan. 166
The court noted that the Service was preparing the recovery plan at
the same time that it was reviewing the City of San Diego’s incidental
take permit, and therefore had the relevant information regarding the
needs and status of the vernal pool species on hand to inform the content
of the incidental take permit. 167 In particular, the court cited the
statement in the vernal pool species recovery plan that the “Riverside
fairy shrimp and their associated watersheds should be secured from
further loss and degradation in a configuration that maintains habitat
function and species viability.” 168 This and other recovery
recommendations were directly in conflict with the MSCP’s allowance
of the “across-the-board destruction” of twelve-percent of vernal pool
habitat. 169
Finally, the court addressed the adequacy of the San Diego MSCP’s
funding. The court observed that the City of San Diego relied on a
variety of uncertain future actions to provide funding for the land
acquisitions required for its portion of the MSCP, and the City expressly
refused to guarantee that funds would be available. 170 In this respect, the
court viewed the funding situation as similar to that in the Natomas Basin
HCP case. In that case, the Section 10 findings were disapproved
because “‘of the City’s explicit refusal to ensure funding’ for the
mitigation, ‘the adequacy of funding depends on whether third parties
decide to participate,’ and ‘no entity will be responsible for making up
the funding shortfall.’” 171 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Fish
not by the twelve-percent cap but by the MSCP’s requirement that vernal pools are to “be avoided to
the maximum extent practicable.” Id. at 1147. The court concluded, however, that avoidance of
vernal pools “to the maximum extent practicable” was a loophole that meant destruction of vernal
pools up to the twelve-percent cap. Id. at 1147–51.
164
Id. at 1152–55.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 1154–55.
167
Id. at 1155 n.25.
168
Id. at 1155.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1156.
171
Id. (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1294–95 (E.D. Cal.
2000)).
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and Wildlife Service “could not rationally conclude that the City will
ensure adequate funding as the ESA requires.” 172 Although the court
noted that the lawsuit was focused on the seven vernal pool species, 173
this portion of the court’s ruling is applicable to the City’s funding
mechanisms for its share of the entire San Diego MSCP—the flawed
funding mechanisms are not limited to the vernal pool species or to the
City’s ability to acquire vernal pool habitat.
The remedy in Southwest Center v. Bartel was two-fold. First, the
court enjoined the Fish and Wildlife Service and the City of San Diego
“from further executing pending site-specific projects under the
[incidental take permit] affecting the seven vernal pool species.” 174 This
injunction applied to three categories of activity: (1) “any and all pending
applications for development of land containing vernal pool habitat”; (2)
“those projects where the City has granted permission, but the
development has not yet physically begun to destroy vernal pool
habitat”; and (3) “further development where the permittee is presently
engaged in the destruction of vernal pool habitat.” 175
Second, the court remanded the case to the Fish and Wildlife
Service for reinitiation of consultation under Section 7 of the ESA for
that agency to consider “revisions of the City of San Diego’s Incidental
Take Permit at least on the seven vernal pool species.” 176 The court
directed the Fish and Wildlife Service to “evaluate the impacts of the
City’s HCP on the seven vernal pool species” and to consider the
“standards and other information” in the vernal pool species recovery
plan during the reinitiated intra-agency consultation. 177 The court further
advised the Fish and Wildlife Service that “during or after that reinitiated
consultation, the Service can consider whether it needs to seek
modification or withdrawal of the MSCP, Subarea Plan, or [incidental
take permit] with regard to covered vernal pool species.” 178
In 2010, the Fish and Wildlife Service canceled the portions of the
incidental take permit covering the vernal pool species. 179 As a result of
this cancellation, applicants for projects that may affect vernal pools
within the City of San Diego are no longer exempted from liability for
take of federally listed vernal pool species by the San Diego MSCP. 180 In
172

Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 821 (9th Cir. 2001).
174
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 1132, 1137.
178
Id. at 1132.
179
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 409 F. App’x 143, 145 (9th Cir. 2011).
180
Id.
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an appeal by the Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation and other
building trade interveners of the scope of Judge Brewster’s injunction,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the appeal was moot and directed the
district court to vacate its injunction, “[b]ecause the portions of the
[incidental take permit] that were the subject of litigation in district court
no longer exist.” 181 The Ninth Circuit further observed that “the
cancellation of the [incidental take permit] means that the City of San
Diego no longer has authority to issue any permits affecting the vernal
pool species. Consequently, there is nothing for the district court to
enjoin.” 182 Following the Ninth Circuit’s order, the district court vacated
the injunction. 183
Although the injunction is gone, the cancellation of the incidental
take permit accomplished much the same result as an injunction because,
as Judge Brewster noted, the “permit cannot be used or relied upon in
any way with respect to [the vernal pool species].” 184 In addition, the
Southwest Center decision directs the Fish and Wildlife Service to
consider specific vernal pool conservation demands, including the
recovery of the vernal pool species, during any reinitiated consultation if
and when the City of San Diego decides to prepare a new vernal pool
HCP. 185 Finally, although the district court did not provide any specific
relief in connection with its conclusion that the City’s funding
mechanisms for the MSCP were inadequate, that portion of the
Southwest Center decision serves as a forceful reminder that adequate
funding for any future vernal pool HCP must be assured. 186
A consistent thread in Judge Brewster’s decision is the recovery of
the vernal pool species. It did not escape the court’s notice that the Fish
and Wildlife Service, the agency that was developing the recovery plan
for the vernal pool species, issued a permit that allowed the take of these
species “without the benefit of a Recovery Plan.” 187 The court further
expressed concern that the MSCP Assurances left no room for the Fish
and Wildlife Service to impose additional mitigation if it “found that a
specific development project would impair the recovery of a vernal pool

181

Id.
Id.
183
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, No. 98-CV-2234-B(WVG), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21163 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011).
184
Id. (emphasis added).
185
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132, 1137, 1162 (S.D.
Cal. 2006). The City of San Diego has stated that it will pursue a new incidental take permit for
vernal pool species in connection with a new vernal pool HCP. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Bartel, 409 F. App’x 143, 145–46 (9th Cir. 2011).
186
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
187
Id. at 1143 n.19.
182

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol6/iss1/6

24

Buse: San Diego's Vulnerable Vernal Pool Species

2012] SAN DIEGO’S VULNERABLE VERNAL POOL SPECIES

77

species.” 188 In its review of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s approval of
the incidental take permit, the court expressly applied a standard that
requires HCPs to demonstrate that they facilitate both the survival and
the recovery of listed species. 189 The court found the permit failed to
meet the ESA’s requirements based on this standard. 190
IV. TAKING RECOVERY SERIOUSLY—A MODEL FOR A FUTURE SAN
DIEGO VERNAL POOL PLAN
When the San Diego MSCP was first adopted, it was praised by
then-Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt as “a model to the nation for
how to plan for and balance the needs of man and nature.” 191 The
decision in Southwest Center v. Bartel suggests that the San Diego
MSCP is a poor model for vernal pool conservation. However, the
Southwest Center decision itself is a model, or at least a blueprint, for
any future San Diego vernal pool HCP. Moreover, in its proper focus on
species recovery, the decision is instructive for all future HCPs.
MSHCPs provide many benefits, such as providing certainty to
landowners and developers, allowing efficient processing of land-use
permits by plan participants, and providing efficient administration of
take authorization by the Fish and Wildlife Service. But it is not clear
that these benefits provide any net conservation benefit in comparison to
a world without MSHCPs. This is ironic because conservation plans
purport to be about conservation.
It is purely speculative to judge the conservation benefits of an HCP
in comparison to no HCP, but the situation in San Diego after the
Southwest Center v. Bartel injunction was vacated provides an
interesting non-speculative case study. After the Fish and Wildlife
Service cancelled the City of San Diego’s incidental take permit for the
seven vernal pool species, there was no take coverage and no HCP for
these species. 192 The post-HCP outlook for the vernal pool species is not
significantly worse, and indeed is arguably better than when the HCP
was in effect for these species. The vernal pool species are still listed and

188

Id. at 1139. See also id. at 1146 (showing MSCP Assurances preclude Fish and Wildlife
Service from making changes to the City’s incidental take permit “that may be necessary to ensure
the survival and recovery of the vernal pool species”).
189
Id. at 1129.
190
Id. at 1123, 1127–28, 1129, 1146, 1147, 1155.
191
John Krist, Court Ruling Offers Warning to Habitat Plan Negotiators, 22 CALIFORNIA
PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2 (2007).
192
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 409 F. App’x 143, 145 (9th Cir. 2011); Sw. Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, No. 98-CV-2234-B(WVG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21163 (S.D.
Cal Mar. 3, 2011).
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their take is prohibited by the ESA. Applicants for development projects
have generally found other ways to obtain take coverage if their projects
affect vernal pools, typically through the Army Corps of Engineers’
Section 7 consultation process. 193 But these projects are still subject to
review and the imposition of “reasonable and prudent” vernal pool
measures to minimize vernal pool impacts by the Fish and Wildlife
Service. 194
Not every project in the City of San Diego will qualify for take
exemption through the Section 7 consultation process based on the
involvement of the Army Corps of Engineers or some other federal
agency. In such cases, projects that might affect vernal pools could
presumably avoid the take prohibition by a combination of avoidance
and mitigation measures. Both are problematic. While avoidance should
be the main method of conserving vernal pools, activities that avoid
direct vernal pool impacts can still significantly affect pools by altering
the hydrology of the upland watershed areas surrounding the pools and
introducing sediment and chemical pollutants. 195 In contrast, vernal pool
mitigation measures typically involve some combination of on-site and
off-site preservation, restoration, and/or creation of vernal pools. As both
Judge Brewster and the Fish and Wildlife Service have observed, these
measures are unsatisfactory and could still result in take of vernal pool
species. 196 Nonetheless, if the post-HCP regulatory environment creates
results in avoidance or mitigation measures that genuinely minimize
vernal pool impacts, it appears to be a better conservation outcome than
under the MSCP, which permitted a project even though it destroyed all
sixty-four vernal pools on the development site. 197
In addition, the San Diego MSCP’s non-coverage of vernal pool
species has resulted in a more expansive critical habitat designation for at
least one vernal pool species. In 2005, when the MSCP covered the
vernal pool species, the Service designated critical habitat for the

193

Even if the affected vernal pools are not subject to the Army Corps’ permitting jurisdiction
as a result of the decision in Solid Waste Agency v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001), there are often other waterbodies conveniently located on the development site that do
support the Army Corps’ jurisdiction and thus trigger interagency cooperation under ESA Section 7,
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (Westlaw 2012).
194
16 U.S.C.A. 1536(b)(2)(4)(C)(ii) (Westlaw 2012).
195
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for
Three Vernal Pool Plants and the Riverside Fairy Shrimp, 58 Fed. Reg. 41384, 41389 (Aug. 3, 1993)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (Westlaw 2012)).
196
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1127 (S.D. Cal. 2006);
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for the San
Diego Fairy Shrimp, 62 Fed. Reg. 4925, 4926 (Feb. 3, 1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)
(Westlaw 2012)).
197
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
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Riverside fairy shrimp but excluded most habitat within the MSCP
planning area, even if it was deemed essential to the conservation of the
species. 198 However, after the decision in Southwest Center v. Bartel, the
Service designated critical habitat for the San Diego fairy shrimp within
the MSCP planning area, specifically citing the decision as the basis for
the more expansive designation. 199 Because critical habitat designation
arguably provides more conservation benefit than HCP coverage
(particularly if the vernal pools designated as critical habitat are not
within the MSCP’s reserve area), the San Diego fairy shrimp may be a
beneficiary of this post-HCP environment. 200
The City of San Diego has announced that it is pursuing a new
incidental take permit for vernal pool species. Thus, whatever benefits
these species derive from the post-HCP environment may not last
forever. The minimum objective for any new vernal pool HCP should be
to provide a clear conservation benefit in comparison to the world
without a vernal pool HCP. Judge Brewster’s decision in Southwest
Center suggests how this objective may be met:
1. The new vernal pool HCP should facilitate both the survival and
recovery of covered species. 201
2. The new vernal pool HCP should respect the recovery standards
and recommendations of the vernal pool species recovery plan. This
does not mean that recovery plan should have the force of law, but if
the HCP is inconsistent with the recovery plan, the HCP and the
associated incidental take permit should provide a reasoned
explanation for the inconsistency and demonstrate that it is still
consistent with the recovery objectives for the covered species. 202
3. The new vernal pool HCP should have a guaranteed source of
adequate funding for the lifetime of the plan. 203
A new vernal pool HCP that fails to meet these criteria would merely
repeat the errors of the previous HCP. Sound conservation planning
and the Southwest Center decision both demand a better outcome for
this second effort.

198

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the
Riverside Fairy Shrimp (Streptocephalus woottoni), 70 Fed. Reg. 19,154, 19,159 (Apr. 12, 2005)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.95(h) (Westlaw 2012)).
199
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the
San Diego Fairy Shrimp (Branchinecta sandiegonensis). 72 Fed. Reg. 70648, 70651 (Dec. 12, 2007)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.95(h) (Westlaw 2012)).
200
The consultation process pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA, for example, expressly requires
consideration of effects on designated critical habitat. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012).
201
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1123, 1127–28, 1129, 1146, 1147,
1155.
202
Id. at 1136–37.
203
Id. at 1156.
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CONCLUSION

There are valid reasons for skepticism regarding the conservation
benefits of MSHCPs. MSHCPs promise much but have delivered mixed
results at best in recovering species. 204 The Fish and Wildlife Service
must consider species recovery when it conducts the jeopardy and
adverse modification analyses during a Section 7 consultation. 205 The
Service must also prepare recovery plans for listed species. As Judge
Brewster recognized in Southwest Center v. Bartel, these plans should
inform the Service’s other conservation actions, including the approval
of HCPs. 206 More fundamentally, the ESA is about recovery. 207 It would
appear to subvert congressional intent if the agency that is charged with
recovering species could also hand out incidental take permits that impair
recovery. 208 The Southwest Center v. Bartel decision provides the basic
outline for developing a new vernal pool HCP for the City of San
Diego—or any HCP—that takes recovery seriously.

204

Langpap & Kerkvliet, supra note 81.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 932–33 (9th Cir.
2007); Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir.
2004).
206
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1136–37.
207
Gifford Pinchot Task Force, 378 F.3d at 1070.
208
One district court nonetheless ruled that the Fish and Wildlife Service could do exactly
that. Spirit of the Sage Council v. Kempthorne, 511 F. Supp. 2d 31, 43 (D.D.C. 2007). In a ruling
that illustrates the perils of non-contextual statutory analysis, the court in Spirit of the Sage Council
expressly disagreed with Southwest Center v. Bartel’s conclusion that HCPs must facilitate both
survival and recovery, concluding that an incidental take permit could be issued if it impairs
recovery, so long as it does not reduce the likelihood of both survival and recovery. Id. In effect,
Spirit of the Sage Council reads the term “conservation” out of conservation plans prepared under
Section 10 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539 (Westlaw 2012).
205
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